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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 16-11390-smb
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	BREITBURN ENERGY PARTNERS LP
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8	Debtor.
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11	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
12	One Bowling Green
13	New York, NY 10004
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15	August 18, 2016
16	11:00 AM - 12:39 PM
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23	BEFORE:
24	HON STUART M. BERNSTEIN
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Page 2 1 Hearing re: Case Conference 2 Hearing re: Debtors' Motion to Seal Exhibits to Declaration 3 4 of James Jackson Supporting Motion Approving Retention and 5 Incentive Programs. 6 7 Hearing re: Application of Official Committee of Unsecured 8 Creditors under 11 U.S.C. 1103 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 9 and 5002, for Order Authorization Retention and Employment of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP as Conflicts 10 11 Counsel. 12 13 Hearing re: Application of the Official Committee of 14 Unsecured Creditors of Breitburn Energy Partners LP, et al., 15 for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Employment and 16 Retention of Porter Hedges LLP as Special Counsel. 17 Hearing re: Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 18 19 105(a) and 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002 for Entry of an 20 Order Authorizing Debtors to Sell Certain Non-essential 21 Assets. 22 23 Hearing re: Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 365 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006 and 9019(a) for Entry of 24 25 an Order Approving (I) Assumption of Executory Contract and

Page 3 1 (II) Settlement Between Debtors and GEXA Energy LP. 2 3 Hearing re: Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365 4 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006 to Assume and Assign Enterprise 5 Fleet Lease, as Amended. 6 7 Hearing re: Application of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 8 327(e), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) and 2016, and Local Rules 9 2014-1 and 2016-1 for Authorization to Employ and Retain Coghlan Crowson, LLP as Litigation Counsel for the Debtors 10 11 Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date 12 13 Hearing re: Application of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 14 327(a) and 328(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a), Authorizing 15 Debtors to Employ and Retain PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as 16 Auditor and Tax Advisor Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date. 17 18 Hearing re: Motion of LL&E Royalty Trust for Relief from the 19 Automatic Stay. 20 21 Hearing re: . Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 22 105, 361, 362, 363, and 364 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001 and 23 Local Rules 4001- and 4001-2 for Authority to (A) Obtain 24 Postpetition Financing, (B) Use Cash Collateral, (C) Grant 25 Certain Protections to Prepetition Secured Parties, and (D)

Page 4 1 Related Relief 2 Hearing re: Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 3 4 363(b), and 503(c)(3) for Entry of an Order Approving 5 Debtors' Retention and Incentive Programs for Certain Key 6 **Employees** 7 8 Hearing re: Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by 9 Felicia Pierce. 10 11 Hearing re: Order to Show Cause Why an Official Committee of 12 Equity Security Holders Should Not Be Appointed. 13 14 Hearing re: Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365 15 Approving Rejection of an Unexpired Non-residential Real 16 Property Lease and the Related Subleases for the Premises 17 Located at 600 Travis Street, Houston, Texas, Effective as of May 31, 2016 18 19 20 Hearing re: Texas Tower Limited's Motion for Payment of 21 Administrative Expense Claim. 22 23 24 Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde 25

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Page 11 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 CLERK: Breitburn. 3 MR. KAROTKIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen 4 Karotkin, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, for the Debtors. I'm here 5 with my colleague, Mr. Schrock. 6 MR. SCHROCK: Good morning, Judge. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. 8 MR. KAROTKIN: Unless Your Honor has some other 9 scheduling in mind, I would suggest we proceed with the 10 agenda. 11 THE COURT: Well, let's take Miss Pierce's case. 12 MR. KAROTKIN: Okay. 13 THE COURT: Ms. Pierce? You can step up. Someone give her a seat, please. Let me start with your payment of 14 15 your fee. 16 MS. PIERCE: Okay. 17 THE COURT: I've entered an Order. You can have a 18 copy. To refund the money, you have to fill out an ROS form 19 for it. So if you go down to Room 534 after the hearing, 20 they'll start the paperwork. I don't know how long it'll 21 take. 22 MS. PIERCE: Okay. 23 THE COURT: All right? You're trying to get money 24 from the government, so good luck. As I understand it, 25 you're seeking to enjoin drilling on your land pending a

Page 12 1 determination of the ownership issue. 2 MS. PIERCE: Yes. Right now, I'm in a Trespass to Try Title suit in Texas, and I was here about a month ago to 3 4 get the stay listed, which was modified. But the thing is I 5 tried to send in a motion for injunction with the court in 6 Texas, and they said I'm violating the stay, so that's the 7 reason why I sent the motion here. 8 THE COURT: And so tell me how long has this 9 drilling been going on? 10 MS. PIERCE: For 80 something years, about 85 11 years. THE COURT: Well, it hasn't -- Breitburn hasn't 12 13 been doing the drilling. 14 MS. PIERCE: Oh, Breitburn, about since 2012. 15 THE COURT: All right. So it's about four years 16 of drilling. 17 MS. PIERCE: Yes, sir. 18 THE COURT: And that's every day? MS. PIERCE: Every day, yes, sir. 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. And tell me why, if you thought 21 about it --22 MS. PIERCE: I'm sorry, sir. 23 THE COURT: If you're right in the end, they must 24 keep records about what they take out of the ground, why they couldn't simply give you a check at the end of the day 25

with the terms that you really owned the property.

MS. PIERCE: Oh, well, one of the things, we did go to Breitburn about a year ago actually. It was about a year ago, and we did speak to them about what the issue was, and that, you know, let them know that they were trespassing. But the thing is that they're claiming it's under adverse position.

THE COURT: No, I understand there's a dispute about who owns the land.

MS. PIERCE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that's what's supposed to be resolved in Texas. And my only point really is, doesn't it make sense to have that issue resolved in Texas -- and I don't know what's going on there at this point on this issue -- and then it turns out that you own the land and you're entitled to money from them to taking the minerals, you send them a bill.

MS. PIERCE: Well, one of the issues is that, like I said, they're going to continue to accumulate damages that will be accumulated on our side. And I do understand what you're saying as far as what they're trying to do right now, I'm having issues in Texas, just to be honest with you. I had a summary judgment that was actually set for hearing on the 2nd of September, which now has been pushed out, and they allowed the Defendant to come in for a dismissal on my

- case. And my thing is, the issue here is, there's no way that, under adverse possession, like I said, there's no way for anyone to own property or for them to claim an ownership on my property under adverse position if -- I mean, you can take into --
- THE COURT: But that's an issue for the Texas

  Court.
- 8 MS. PIERCE: Yes, sir.

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- THE COURT: That's what Texas Court is going to -so if I do hear an injunction motion -- and I'm not hearing
  it today, I'm hearing theirs today.
- MS. PIERCE: Yes.
  - THE COURT: I'm going to have to make the same determination, or at least figure out whether you're likely to succeed on that determination, so you wind up trying the same case twice essentially. And that doesn't sound like it makes a lot of sense.
  - MS. PIERCE: Yeah. That's the reason why I put
    the lis pendens back on the -- in Texas. I put the lis
    pendens on there. The lis pendens sat out there for five
    months and nobody could dispute it. Now there was an ad put
    in the newspaper that I was unlawfully clouding the
    property, but no one brought a motion to expunge it, no one
    -- because they can't. And that's the reason why I reported
    bankruptcy fraud because they're bringing this property to

1 be taken by the Court.

And it's putting me in a situation and my family in a situation where I'm having to come here because six days later after I filed this lawsuit and, like I said, it's been going on for years, so a lot of money been made -- we're talking about millions of dollars been made out there -- and that's the reason why I followed them here. I followed him because I knew I had the evidence, and that's what's been avoided in Texas and that's been avoided right now.

THE COURT: But isn't it coming to a head in

Texas. In other words, you've moved for summary judgment,

and as I understand it, the Defendants have moved to

dismiss.

MS. PIERCE: Yeah, they moved for a dismiss. They pushed my date back so they can move for a dismiss on the 2nd and push mine back to October 7th.

THE COURT: But, okay, all right. Let me hear from the Debtor.

MS. PIERCE: Okay.

THE COURT: In terms of what's going on in Texas and what the schedule is.

MR. KAROTKIN: I don't exactly know what's going on in Texas, but what Miss Pierce says sounds correct. We can certainly get more details on that. We did, Your Honor,

Page 16 1 as you know, agree to accommodate Miss Pierce, agree to a 2 limited modification of the estate, elect the litigation to 3 proceed in Texas. Despite that, she's now seeking this injunctive relief down here. 4 THE COURT: Well, she's seeking additional relief. 5 6 She's seeking what's based on the assumption or the belief 7 that she owns the property. 8 MR. KAROTKIN: I understand that. 9 THE COURT: As opposed to just determining the 10 dispute. 11 MR. KAROTKIN: I understand that. She's also sent 12 letters to the Department of Justice asserting bankruptcy 13 fraud and other things. 14 THE COURT: That's her right as a citizen. 15 MR. KAROTKIN: I think that borders on continuing 16 violations of the stay, Your Honor, seeking to enforce her 17 claim, but we can leave that for another day. 18 As you said before, we're happy to go forward in 19 Texas to adjudicate the primary issue. And as you said, if 20 she wins, she has a claim like everybody else. But beyond 21 that, we're not prepared to agree to anything. If she 22 commences an adversary proceeding, we'll address the 23 allegations at the appropriate time. 24 THE COURT: All right. Miss Pierce, it doesn't 25 look like there's a meeting of the minds in terms of how to

Page 17 1 proceed. So what you're going to have to do is file an 2 adversary proceeding --MS. PIERCE: I did that. 3 THE COURT: -- and identify who it is you're 4 5 suing, because I'm looking at what you filed, the motion, 6 and you have listed the United States Trustee Susan Golden, 7 Richard Morris. You're not suing those people; they have 8 nothing to do with the drilling. It's the entity that has 9 the rights and/or is actually doing the drilling that you're 10 looking to stop. So if you file an adversary proceeding, 11 then I'll treat this motion as a motion for a preliminary 12 injunction and I'll schedule an evidentiary hearing. 13 MS. PIERCE: You said if I do the adversary? 14 THE COURT: You got to file an adversary 15 proceeding. 16 MS. PIERCE: I did that this morning. I filed an 17 adversary this morning. THE COURT: Okay. Who's the Defendant in the 18 19 adversary? 20 MS. PIERCE: I have Breitburn, but I also have the 21 Trustees on there as well, but I have Breitburn down as the 22 Defendant. 23 THE COURT: All right. I'll schedule a hearing on 24 the motion for preliminary injunction. 25 MS. PIERCE: Okay. And, Your Honor, before we end

this, I want to say one other reasons why I wanted to go ahead and get this done because they often reconstructuring, and this is done too. I don't know what's going to happen as far as the monetary gain from these, and it may -- you know, we may not come out with the same amount of damages because of that. And that's the reason why I'm asking that you go ahead and order that Breitburn --THE COURT: The damages may not be the same, but -- well, your damages will be the same, but the amount that it's worth may not be the same. MS. PIERCE: Exactly. So I would just ask let you

go ahead and order, I mean, at least until we can resolve this in Texas and that's up until October.

THE COURT: When is the motion for, when is the motion to dismiss scheduled for in Texas?

MS. PIERCE: It's on the 2nd of September.

THE COURT: The 2nd of September.

MS. PIERCE: Yes, sir. And then my motion for summary judgment is on October 7th, so I'm just kind of --I'm asking that you do it at least up until October 7th.

THE COURT: Well, I'll certainly wait because, you know, if the Texas Court resolves the issue, that'll make it simpler. Why don't we do this; why don't we have another conference sometime around the middle of October. You can appear by telephone if you want; you don't necessarily have

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2 MS. PIERCE: Is there any way that you could do up until the 2nd at least of September? 3

THE COURT: Let's see what the Texas Court does. It may not decide the matter anyway; it may reserve decision to review the papers, or it may simply decide the matter. But, and independent of what it decides, may have or may not have relevance in terms of the argument you're making.

MS. PIERCE: Your Honor, I mean, I don't want to be a -- I really need for you to do this. I really do. need for you to do this so that we can move because they are continuing damages. They are still -- it is what it is itself, and they are stealing for us, and the came to the bankruptcy court to get away from this case is what it is. We're just asking that you go ahead and grant the injunction so we could move for -- because going to continue to do this.

THE COURT: I'm not going to grant the injunction today. And I will tell you two things, I don't want to argue with you today. One, I don't think you're irreparably harmed. The law means you don't have an adequate remedy at law, and damages are an adequate remedy at law. And even if I grant the injunction, it's going to be conditioned on your posting a bond.

> MS. PIERCE: Okay.

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THE COURT: So depending on the amount of money that they could lose during the duration of the injunction, that bond may be very, very large because they don't have to bear the risk necessarily that they're right and you're wrong. You're the person seeking the injunction. I just want you to bear that in mind that you could win the battle and lose the war on this one at the end of the day.

But what I will is I will schedule another conference for October 18th. As I say, you could appear telephonically if you want. You're welcome to come up -- the weather is still nice -- and do your thing. It'll be at 10:00. If you do want to appear telephonically, you have to look at our website. We use something called Court Cal, and it'll tell you how to dial in and arrange to use it. Okay? But if you can't figure it out, just call my chambers.

MS. PIERCE: Can I ask you as far as with the lis pendens be out there.

THE COURT: I don't understand what that means;
lis pendens usually just means that if you transfer
property, you transfer it subject to whatever interest is
listed. So if they're going to transfer the property, I
guess there's a lis pendens. Whether or not the filing of
that lis pendens violated the automatic stay, I don't know.
Because if it interferes with their possession or control of
the property, it might, but that's for another day.

Pg 21 of 92 Page 21 1 I think that what you want is the Texas Court to 2 decide whether you own the land or not, and that's what you 3 should be focused on. And I appreciate the fact that you're 4 losing money, or you feel you're losing money, because 5 they're withdrawing the valuable minerals or oil and gas 6 from the property, but it's been going on for four years 7 already. 8 MS. PIERCE: Yeah. 9 THE COURT: And that's another thing that cuts 10 against your argument that you've been irreparably harmed. 11 But why don't we have another conference on October 18th. 12 You can report back in terms of what's happening. And if 13 nothing's resolved, I'll just schedule a hearing on the 14 motion for a preliminary injunction. 15 MS. PIERCE: Okay. Will we doing a -- do I need 16 to schedule a hearing for the adversary? 17 THE COURT: The adversary, they'll issue a 18 summons, which will schedule a hearing. Do you have a 19 summons yet? 20 MS. PIERCE: I'll have to get the summons. 21 THE COURT: When you get the summons, it will 22 schedule a hearing date.

23 MS. PIERCE: Okay.

> THE COURT: You'll see it one of the boxes there, a pretrial conference date, but that's just a pretrial

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Page 22 1 conference. Okay? Okay. 2 MS. PIERCE: 3 THE COURT: All right, good luck. You want to be 4 heard on this matter, Mr. Morrissey. 5 MR. MORRISSEY: If I may, yes. For the record, 6 Richard Morrissey for the U.S. Trustee. As Your Honor has 7 noted, both Susan Golden and I have been named as party 8 Defendants in this adversary proceeding. And just to inform 9 Your Honor, there is an adversary proceeding number, so 10 there was a Complaint filed. 11 THE COURT: What's the adversary proceeding? MR. MORRISSEY: The number is 16-01198. 12 13 THE COURT: 01198, okay. 14 MR. MORRISSEY: And I'm sure Your Honor will not 15 be surprised to hear that we would like to have ourselves 16 dismissed as party Defendants, especially in light of the 17 fact that no summons has yet been issued. We'd like to do 18 that, if possible, before that if Miss Pierce is amenable to 19 that. 20 THE COURT: I don't think you have a claim against the Department of Justice; they're not drilling. 21 22 MS. PIERCE: No, I didn't. THE COURT: And they'd rather not be included as 23 parties in the lawsuit because then they have to turn it 24 25 over to the Department of Justice to defend them and make a

Page 23 1 motion to dismiss and then you'll have to come up, and I'll 2 probably dismiss them from the case anyway. MR. MORRISSEY: So I think the simplest thing, 3 Your Honor, would be simply if we could submit an Order to 4 5 the Court dismissing the two of us as party Defendants. 6 THE COURT: You know, you're named and there's a 7 procedure for that. Why don't you talk to Ms. Pierce about 8 asking her if she would agree to dismiss you and Ms. Golden. 9 If not, you can make a motion to dismiss. It doesn't have 10 to be extensive. 11 MR. MORRISSEY: If Ms. Pierce does agree, perhaps 12 a Stipulation. 13 THE COURT: A Stipulation is fine. 14 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. I don't think you want to sue 16 them. Okay, back to the calendar. Thank you very much. 17 MS. PIERCE: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: If you go down -- Miss Pierce, if you go down to Room 534, they should give you the IRS W-9 form 19 20 if they have it. It's in the Order, it'll tell you exactly 21 what you need to do. Good luck. 22 MS. PIERCE: Thank you. 23 THE COURT: By the way, you know, you have to pay 24 a filing fee for the adversary. Did you do that? 25 MS. PIERCE: I did.

Page 24 1 THE COURT: Okay. All right, let's go back to the 2 beginning of the calendar now. 3 CLERK: Start with #1, sir? THE COURT: All right, numbers -- we're actually 4 5 doing to do 1 and 2 together. Numbers 1 and 2 are 6 applications by the creditor's committee to retain conflicts counsel and special counsel on behalf of the --7 8 MR. KAROTKIN: (indiscernible) yesterday, we have 9 certificates of no objection. 10 MR. LEBLANC: Numbers 3 is signed, Your Honor, but 11 not items #1 and 2. We may have missed it, but either way, 12 we just ask the Court to enter them this morning. 13 THE COURT: All right, I thought I had signed it. But is there any objection to the retention of -- what it is 14 15 -- committee counsel and special counsel? 16 MR. LEBLANC: It's a conflict, yes -- co-counsel 17 for the committee and special counsel to do certain 18 investigations. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Does anybody object? 20 record should reflect there's no response. Those 21 applications are granted. As I say, I thought I signed the 22 Orders, but if I didn't, just submit Orders. 23 MR. KAROTKIN: Number 3, Your Honor, you did sign it. 24 25 So it is signed. THE COURT:

MR. KAROTKIN: Number 4, another uncontested motion requesting authority to sell certain nonessential assets. I will point out, Your Honor, that there are three transactions in there. We are not seeking approval at this time of the transaction with GEXA; that will be adjourned to another date. The other two are relatively minor transactions: one for certain oil and gas leases and related assets for \$150,000; and the other with respect to certain non-core surface rights for \$75,000.

Your Honor, these really are in the ordinary course of business. But out of an abundance of caution, we are asking the Court for approval. The only objection that was filed, Your Honor, was by U.S. Specialty Insurance.

We've had conversations with them; that objection has been resolved by me making a representation that no U.S.

Specialty bond is affected by the relief sought in the motion, and we so represent that.

The U.S. Attorney's Office also requested that we include certain language in the proposed Order, some customary language with respect to environmental matters, which we have agreed to include. I can hand up the revised Order if you'd like.

THE COURT: Why don't you just drop it off in chambers. Let me ask, does anybody want to be heard in connection with the motion? The record should reflect

Page 26 1 there's no response. I will grant the applications. 2 MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, sir. 3 THE COURT: Next is the Enterprise contract. 4 MR. KAROTKIN: Again, no objections were filed to 5 that. The motion is self-explanatory. It's really no 6 economic impact on the Debtors, but to recognize the fact 7 that certain vehicles will be kept by the Debtors, certain 8 will be kept by Pacific Coast Energy as the Debtors will no 9 longer have any interest to them. All of the parties have 10 agreed and no objections were filed. 11 THE COURT: Does anybody want to be heard in 12 connection with that application? The record should reflect 13 there's no response. It's granted. 14 MR. KAROTKIN: I think we skipped #5. 15 THE COURT: Is that the one we just did, or is 16 that GEXA? 17 MR. KAROTKIN: Yeah. 18 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 19 MR. KAROTKIN: That's an Order approving 20 essentially a settlement in GEXA Energy, which is a utility 21 supplier, that resolves any concerns that GEXA had with 22 respect to the 366 Order entered earlier in the case. 23 Again, the motion is self-explanatory and no objections were 24 filed. 25 THE COURT: Does anybody want to be heard in

connection with that motion? The record should reflect there's no response. It's granted.

MR. KAROTKIN: Numbers 7 and 8, perhaps we could take together. Number 7 is an application for the Debtors to retain Coghlan Crowson, LLP as litigation counsel for the Debtors and nunc pro tunc to the petition date. As I recall, Your Honor, this is the law firm that is involved with the Piece action in Texas. Again, no objections filed; we would ask that that be granted. And Number 7 is the application for the Debtors to employ and retain Price Waterhouse as their auditors and tax advisors. Again, both of these objections have -- both of these applications have been reviewed with the Office of the United States Trustee. To their requested any modifications, those were made, and I believe the U.S. Trustee has signed off on them.

THE COURT: Does anybody object to the retention of Coghlan Crowson as special counsel in the Texas litigations? The record should reflect there's no response. That's approved. Does anybody want to be heard on Price Waterhouse retentions? The record should reflect there's no response. I just have a couple of comments: one, there's a dispute resolution provision.

MR. KAROTKIN: This is in Price Waterhouse, sir?

THE COURT: Yeah. If you're looking at the top,

you know, with the ECF numbers, it's page 34 of 73.

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1	MR. KAROTKIN: Can you give me one moment?
2	THE COURT: Sure.
3	MR. KAROTKIN: In the Order, sir?
4	THE COURT: No, it's in the it's actually one
5	of the letters that contain the term. Across the top, it's
6	page 34 of 73, document 340.
7	MR. KAROTKIN: Yes.
8	THE COURT: It's got a dispute resolution
9	procedure, which I assume is a usual non-bankruptcy
10	provision that's put in there. But any disputes relating to
11	the fees with the retention have to be resolved here.
12	MR. KAROTKIN: I think we addressed that, Your
13	Honor, in the proposed Order.
14	THE COURT: You have the revised Order?
15	MR. KAROTKIN: Yes.
16	THE COURT: May I see the revised Order?
17	MR. KAROTKIN: May I approach?
18	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay, you resolved the other
19	issue as to the exoneration and limitation of
20	(indiscernible). So I will approve the retention of Price
21	Waterhouse. You can submit an Order.
22	MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you. We go now to the
23	contested matters, Your Honor. The first item is the motion
24	for relief of the stay, #9, filed by LL&E Royalty Trust.
25	THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMMER: Your Honor, Michael Hammer appearing on behalf of LL&E Royalty Trust. I'm from the law firm of Dickinson Wright. This is our motion for relief from the automatic stay to allow pending Texas State Court litigation to proceed. That litigation was filed by the Debtor in 2015 to resolve continuing disputes regarding 1983 conveyance of an overriding royalty interest in certain leases of oil and gas wells located in Florida and Alabama. Under that, conveyance of trust was conveyed 50 percent of the generated net proceeds; the working interest holders control the other 50 percent.

We believe this motion should be viewed in the context of the Debtor's prior motion to authorize to pay ongoing royalty interest at Docket #16, which was granted by this Court on June 15, 2016, pursuant to Docket 135. The Debtor made statements in that motion that are relevant to this dispute. They said proceeds from royalty interest are not property under the estate under 541(e)(6).

THE COURT: Does the conveyance say that they'll hold the special escrow fund in trust?

MR. HAMMER: The conveyance says you could earmark certain funds for special future costs, and that you either put it in an escrow or you treat it as if it were put into escrow, and they chose the latter and they put it in account called special costs escrow account.

Page 30 1 THE COURT: Where was that in the conveyance? 2 MR. HAMMER: It is -- the conveyance is a little 3 confusing on these points because it speaks of a special 4 escrow, a special cost escrow. So I tabbed those pages --5 they are -- the one that talks about putting it in escrow as 6 -- treating it as if it were put in escrow is Paragraph 7 8(h). THE COURT: Is there a number, a Bates number, on 8 9 the bottom? 10 MR. HAMMER: Yeah. It is Bates 31 and it is of 11 our 17 of 37. 12 THE COURT: I got it, okay. 13 MR. HAMMER: So in that motion there said it holds 14 no legal title to the percent of production attributable to 15 the royalty trust and holds any such funds solely for the 16 benefit of the holder. And they did state as unclear if the 17 automatic stay applies to an action to obtain possession or 18 control over the royalty payments. In its response to this 19 motion --20 THE COURT: Even if your ownership is disputed? 21 MR. HAMMER: Well, correct, it's if -- we're 22 entitled to 50 percent of the net proceeds. Instead of 23 paying that, they're holding the funds. We say they have 24 grossly estimated the cost that those relate to, and those 25 are our property in payable to us.

THE COURT: But you said the automatic stay

doesn't decline. And this sounds like it's essentially a

contractual dispute in which if you're right, then the

result might be that some portion of money that they're

holding is your property or that they owe you a debt because

they used some portion of your money under some other

purpose.

MR. HAMMER: Well, but it's exactly the type of conveyance that the Debtor spoke of in its motion to approve royalty interest.

THE COURT: No, I don't understand the Debtor to be saying that if you're right, this isn't your property necessarily, but it still has to -- it's still essentially a contractual disagreement. In other words, you don't know if it's your property until you prevail on your contract claim.

MR. HAMMER: Right. Well, I'd say it's more than that. If we prove that we're right under the conveyance and those funds were always our property, so there's an escrowed set of funds, approximately \$18.3 million, and there's current net proceeds that are being generated is unclear what's going on. So when the Debtor claims in its response that the Trust is simply an unsecured creditor, it should just file a proof of claim, it has no interest in property and has no right to litigate its entitlement to these royalty proceeds. We disagree. We think that's what the

Debtor completely overlooks his royalty motion and --

THE COURT: But that's the only authority you've cited. In other words, that's why I asked you about the conveyance. Is there anything in the conveyance that requires them to hold the money in trust or makes it to a property or something like that, all you're citing is the royal motion. And my response is that your rights are still essentially based on a contract, and in order to prove the ownership, you would have to successfully litigate the contract claim. That's what I'm saying.

MR. HAMMER: Well, litigate semantics, but to us, it's more than a contract. It's a conveyance of real property and they are withholding it and holding the funds. So if we're right, then that's our property in that fund. But, go ahead.

THE COURT: No, they were speaking. I asked them to hold it down.

MR. HAMMER: If we're right, those are our funds and they're being held and there's additional funds being generated, and we claim an interest in that property. And to do nothing, to just say file a proof of claim, will not resolve the \$18 million that's being held in this special cost escrow account and that is being additionally generated. So it is different than just filing a proof of claim; it would not resolve the issue if we just filed a

1 proof of claim.

THE COURT: Tell me about the other claims you're seeking to pursue -- the tort claims, the conspiracy claims, and all those other things.

MR. HAMMER: There's a history here that's even beyond this Debtor where various parties were involved in various capacities. Some of them were prior working interest holders; some of them are a general partner of what's called a royalty partnership that's involved in this primarily for tax --

THE COURT: You could pursue those claims without the Debtor. Why would I grant your relief from the stay to pursue a tort claim against the Debtor?

MR. HAMMER: Because the primary claim is the money that is held by the Debtor that, if we're right, is our property.

THE COURT: Okay. But if you're telling me that the Debtor tortuously breached its contract, that's just a breach of contract claim, and I understand that claim. If you're telling me that the Debtor was involved in a conspiracy with prior working interest holders, that goes well beyond the contract that we're talking about.

MR. HAMMER: It is true in pleading this case in Texas, the State Court litigators did throw in a bunch of claims. But the primary claim that's driving this is to try

to get possession and control over what we view as our property that's being held in the special cost escrow, that is continuing to be generated today, and it is unclear what happened. So if we did nothing, just file a proof of claim, and we are right that they have and continue to this day every month generate these net proceeds without paying to us, there's \$18.3 million that suddenly isn't there, then they've converted our property, and the problem postpetition becomes, you know, a much more magnified to them.

We're just asking to have this dispute, allow it to be resolved because it's more than just a claim; there's actually money there that we claim entitlement to. And, you know, if you were to say, okay, I'm going to lift the stay, but I'm going to let you focus on control or interest in the property and any other damages, you know, were they awarded had to be dealt with in a plan or something like that, that's fine. But I do think the primary purpose of this is we've been -- in every year until they took over, we were getting multi-regular royalty events. We got \$300 million over 23 years. Once they took over, we never got another nickel. And so, you know, we do have to show that those net proceeds are properly payable for us that they've included improper costs in trying to calculate those.

I do believe, as the working interest holders, there's another 50 percent that they continue to receive.

We don't know that for sure, but it's not put in the escrow. So they're, in effect, being paid for their working interests, which includes managing these fields. This is, in a sense, a cost of their doing business. I mean, they're getting the other half of the 50 percent. We want our proceeds dealt with. And we think it's important and it certainly fits under the Sonnax factors that there's cause to do that.

You know, this litigation -- you're right, there's claims against -- the Debtor started this litigation. We filed counterclaims against the Debtor Plaintiff. We filed third-party claims against other Debtor entities that were involved in various capacities in this, as either prior working interest holders or operators. And we do have claims against six non-Debtors who were involved in various interest -- ConocoPhillips was prior, a working interest holder, is also general partner under -- and actually, they have three Counterclaims back.

We faced a situation where the Debtor says, well, it will just stay its action, but its action is not stayed right now. And our claims against the third-party entities and their claims back against us certainly are not stayed.

THE COURT: Debtor, okay.

MR. HAMMER: So the Debtor commenced this action.

They just say, never mind. Well, I can see why they want to

know, why have it resolved and just leave it hanging out there. I don't see how -- it has to be resolved. And so, if we end up filing an adversary proceeding in front of this Court to say we need to resolve our interest in that property, then you would still have the Texas State Court proceeding with all the other claims without the party that's currently controlling the funds.

So just let me briefly put it into the Sonnax factors, if that's okay.

THE COURT: Sure, that's what we're here for, you know.

MR. HAMMER: I know, I know. Sonnax factors 1 and 10, we believe, go hand in hand because stay relief would result in a full resolution of the issues, it would serve judicial economy. Only the Texas State Court can give the complete relief because this Court can't resolve the state law claims between the six non-Debtors. The Debtor's really only response to that is in our prayer for relief, we seek punitive damages, and the Texas State Court couldn't resolve the punitive damage issue. That, instead, should be reserved for the Bankruptcy Court.

We do think that is sort of the tail wagging the dog, and this case is about us getting possession and control over our royalty payments. And to the extent we get

an award greater than our property for royalties that were payable to us, I suppose if it was important to this Court, we could just come back and they could be identified if they're punitive damages in this award and the Debtor could deal with it in a plan as it wants to; but, ultimately, what we want is the money in escrow and the current money being generated subject to our interest.

So, otherwise, and there's a (indiscernible), we face an adversary proceeding and multiple lawsuits. They would, even if we brought the adversary proceeding here, they would have to monitor what's going on in the Texas Court.

So as to Sonnax factors 2 and 7, lack of any connection or interference with a case and no creditors to creditors. I mean, this is -- I refer to what the Debtor said in its royalty motion at Paragraph 28, "No creditors should be prejudiced by the requested relief as royalty payments are not property of the state and the Debtors have no right to distribute royalty interest to creditors."

So there's really two choices -- they can hold the funds or they pay us. But there's not a third choice where the Debtor just gets to keep the money. And as I indicated, there's probably a greater impact it'll do nothing and find out this is continuing on all during the case. The Debtor says, well, we're missing the point. There is an impact;

it's their cost to defend. But as I pointed out, we do
believe this type of dispute, since they are getting
compensated for the working interest, is inherent to the
business. It's a cost of their doing business. Part of
their working interest, they have to assume responsibility
under these conveyances.

And to the extent we're dealing with post-petition action, the Sonnax says those do not implicate the purpose of the stay. As to the Sonnax factor 3, whether the other proceeding involves the Debtors of fiduciary, the Debtor says it doesn't. But it does, in its royalty motion, acknowledges when it holds funds attributable to the conveyance holder, it holds them for the benefit of another, and that is the primary kind of rationale behind is this factor met. It's not their money; they're saying, well, geez, it should be held for something else, but there's no circumstances where it really is theirs.

As a Sonnax factor 4, we know it's a Harris County, Texas State Court located in Houston.

THE COURT: Isn't it theirs to the extent that they can use it to pay these costs? In other words, when does it -- is it your money that they can use to pay costs; is that what you're saying?

MR. HAMMER: What they're saying is when we calculate to the net proceeds, there should be a deduction.

We can hold money for future costs. And so, these aren't really your net proceeds, but they're earmarked for these special costs. And just to put in a little bit of historical context, I mean, this conveyance was done in 1983. Over a long period of time -- so you can -- I didn't put this in our papers. I just want to give a history and you can take it as that.

But there's only \$4 million over a long period of time that was ever escrowed, and half of it was half --

THE COURT: I've seen your papers.

MR. HAMMER: -- and half of it was funded by the working interest and half by us. And suddenly when they take over, it's a gigantic increase in these funds. So we think, and there was also prior litigation in which the whole overriding royalty interest -- not by this Debtor -- but previously, was attempted to be terminated. So we're on edge about this and our money is sitting in the account.

So while the Harris County, Texas Court, technically not a specialized tribunal, certainly State

Court in Texas sitting in Houston has experience in oil and gas issues.

Sonnax factor 6, does the action primarily involve third parties. We know the Debtor is very important, but a simple math of 6 of 10 are non-Debtor parties. Sonnax factor 8 is satisfied because any judgment claim would not

be subject to equitable subordination. Sonnax factor 9 is satisfied because the trust success in the underlying proceeding were not resolved and are avoidable judicial lien.

Then you get to Sonnax factor 12, the impact on the stay on the parties and the balances of harm. The Debtor chose this forum. It is the Plaintiff in the litigation. They acknowledge in a royalty motion that there's really no harm to the estate as these are not its funds. We're, in effect, litigating our money.

THE COURT: Yeah, but that's what you say. They say it's not your money, I guess.

MR. HAMMER: I don't think they say they could keep the --

THE COURT: Or they say they don't have to pay it to you. They can escrow it, use it for special other costs.

MR. HAMMER: Right, but it's not going to be. I don't understand them to say that it's going to be funds distributable in this bankruptcy case. It's either going to be used for costs related to those working interests or not. They've already filed an application to employ special counsel in this matter at Docket 357. And we believe -- and I'm wrapping up -- without stay relief, there would be continuing harm to us. We don't have the mechanism to deal with the recovery of the funds in the account or have those

issues resolved. This continues to go on every month postpetition without resolution.

And while they say they won't, they could continue the litigation, but we can't fully assert counterclaims and third-party claims against the Debtor parties, but just to say, oh, great, we'll stay as to everyone. It can't be stayed because there's the six non-Debtor parties, and we believe it'll be harmful to all the parties to have to deal with multiple avenues for this.

So at least two factors, Sonnax factor 5, whether the insurer assumes responsibility.

THE COURT: The litigation against the tort claims are very different. You're not litigating over your own money then. Those are money damage claims that you happen to join six or 10 parties in. But that's very different from the first claim you're describing, which is a claim where you say this is our property and you have to pay us.

MR. HAMMER: And I understand that. I understand the lawyers in the State Court in Texas would seek some type of injunctive relief to at least make sure the funds are held while the issue is being resolved. And if there's a way to carve that out that we deal with, you know, what are we entitled to as royalty payments, that would be something that is workable to us.

And then the last factor, 11, whether the parties

are ready for trial, that is not met. We are through the initial pleadings stage, all the claims, crossclaims, third-party claims, counterclaims have been filed, all the Answers have been filed in the cases ready to go. So we do believe, and we understand your concerns though that we have satisfied 10 to 12 Sonnax factors and we believe this issue needs to be resolved. And while it will take effort by the Debtor to do it in the context of this case since it won't resolve in distributable proceeds, the relief should be granted. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. KAROTKIN: Stephen Karotkin, Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the Debtors. I think, Your Honor, you put your finger on it. This is a simple contract dispute.

THE COURT: It's not quite simple, I was just asking questions.

MR. KAROTKIN: Well, I think it is important.

Who's entitled to money, it's a contract dispute. He

admitted it was a contract dispute, he's cutting through it

all. All they're seeking is money damages, and that is the

primary claim.

THE COURT: See, that's what I'm trying to figure out, whether the dispute will result in a determination that that's their property, or the dispute will result in a determination that they have a claim against you like every

- other prepetition creditor, at least to the extent that the prepetition (crosstalk).
- MR. KAROTKIN: I think it's the latter. The claim is are they entitled to this money, who is entitled to the proceeds, are we obligated to pay them under the conveyance agreement. I think it's really that.
- THE COURT: So you brought a claim in Texas, which would basically resolve that issue for a breach of contract.
- 9 MR. KAROTKIN: It's a declaratory judgment to resolve that issue.
  - THE COURT: So why not just go forward with it and decide that, which is obviously, they could assert a claim.

    They could say that it's our money, not yours. It's the same claim.
    - MR. KAROTKIN: Again, the normal procedure -- this is no different than any other type of claim.
    - THE COURT: Except you brought, you brought -- let me just finish. You brought a declaratory judgment proceeding, which if it's stayed, would resolve the same issue that the Defendant is raising, at least with respect to the contract rights -- put aside the tort claims for a minute.
    - MR. KAROTKIN: Prepetition, yes. Prepetition, we brought a declaratory judgment, and because this dispute was going on, it could have been -- it was a similar dispute was

Page 44 1 brought by them previous to that time. It's no different 2 than any other general unsecured prepetition claim. you've noted -- actually, as you noted in the SunEdison case 3 4 about an hour ago, and the appropriate procedure is not to 5 have this management devote its resources to litigating 6 simple prepetition contract rights in another forum. 7 THE COURT: How did you deal with your pending 8 claim though in Texas? It's not stayed. 9 MR. KAROTKIN: We've agree to stay it. We agreed 10 not to proceed. 11 THE COURT: Not if that judge says no, I'm not 12 going to stay on; you filed it; or the other side objects 13 and says, no, you shouldn't stay it, this should be 14 resolved, basically making the same argument that was just 15 made. 16 MR. KAROTKIN: First of all, I've never seen that 17 happen. I can't imagine the Judge in Texas would entertain that type of a thing. It doesn't make any sense. 18 The 19 appropriate procedure --20 THE COURT: When's the next hearing in Texas on 21 this issue, do you know? 22 MR. KAROTKIN: No, I don't know. I mean, this litigation in Texas, despite what counsel said, this is in 23 24 its infancy. This case was commenced in February -- in

October of last year, I'm sorry. Discovery hasn't even

started. The case hasn't moved forward at all. There is no interest in judicial economy in having that case proceed in the State of Texas. The most efficient way, Your Honor, is the claims resolution process in this Court, and that you noted in the cases that they cited in (indiscernible). I mean, as I think you noted earlier, they haven't cited one case that supports what they are saying.

They cite your decision in New York Medical. And, as I'm sure you may recall, that case, you say, "A creditor holding a general unsecured claim files their claim in the Bankruptcy Court and the claim is deemed allowed, unless a party with standing objects." Objections are resolved in the Bankruptcy Court, and the claims objection process usually results in a liquidation of the allowed amount of the claim. As Judge Gerber noted, that's the most efficient way to do things. That doesn't distract the Debtor in its management to go pursue what may be, the way he describes it, complicated litigation in Texas, devoting their resources to that.

It's totally contrary to what Section 362 is designed to protect from the Debtor's perspective. There's no unfairness here. We've agreed not to pursue our claims. Our claims are simply the converse of their claims. It's exactly the same thing -- who is entitled to the money and, you know, they haven't satisfied their burden under the

Sonnax factors. As I said, they cases they cite, you know, either with cases that are ready for trial, cases where the Court lets summary judgment motion go forward. There's not one case that they cite which allows the stay to be modified in a situation like this, where the case is in its infancy. It's totally contrary to the statutory provisions.

And the fact that they say they'll commence an adversary proceeding in this Court, that's inappropriate.

The process is file a claim like every other prepetition creditor. That's the appropriate procedure, that's the way the resolution process is efficiently administered. And there is nothing unique here about what they are seeking.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. What I'd like to hear from the parties -- not today, I'll give you a chance to brief it -- is, and it's really directly in the first instance, I guess, at the movant, whether this is a case where you have a property interest in the funds that are being withheld or they're held in trust on some theory like that, or whether at the end of the day, all you have is a claim against the Debtor and this is just a prepetition breach of contract claim.

All right, I'll give you two weeks, and I want to hear more than the Debtors took a position of a royalty position. They have to refer to the documents themselves and any applicable law. I don't know if this is a common

way that these types of projects are wrong and as law in Texas, in terms of what your interest is in that escrow funds under the contract. I'll give you two weeks to submit simultaneous briefs.

I mean, in the interim, if the Texas Court decides, yeah, I'll just stay everything, I'd certainly like to know that also. Whether the Texas Court is going to forward at least on the contract claim, which the Debtor brought, I'd like to know that also.

MR. HAMMER: Thanks.

THE COURT: Next? Financing, I think?

MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, the next item, Your Honor, is #10 on the agenda, which is the final hearing on the Debtor-in-possession financing. And let me just give you, if I may, some quick background.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAROTKIN: The only objection that was filed to the approval of the Debtor-in-possession on a final basis was by the creditor's committee. That was several weeks ago, prior to the last hearing we held that was basic -- where another interim Order was entered. As you may recall, responses to that objection were filed by both the Debtors and the DIP lenders, and I think, as set forth in the response that we filed a day or two ago. And we're pleased to report, and I think that counsel for both the committee

Page 48 1 and the DIP lenders can confirm that all but one of the 2 issues raised in the objection filed by the creditor's committee have been resolved. 3 Yesterday, we filed with the Court a form of 4 5 proposed final revised DIP Order that reflects the 6 resolution of those issues, together with a blackline 7 against the amended interim DIP Order that was entered by 8 the Court. I believe you should have copies, but we can 9 hand it up to the Court. 10 THE COURT: Maybe on the next. 11 MR. KAROTKIN: You have both? 12 THE COURT: Let me just see if I have it. Which 13 tab was it in your book, do you know? 14 MR. KAROTKIN: Ten, and then there are letter tabs 15 with the various pleadings. 16 THE COURT: Do you know what binder it is? 17 MR. KAROTKIN: Is it L? THE COURT: All right, I know what the --18 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, it's L. 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. KAROTKIN: Would you like a --22 THE COURT: I have it. 23 MR. KAROTKIN: -- color copy? THE COURT: I got it. And the unresolved issues 24 25 are the committee standing and their right to -- its right

to take 2000 toward discovery.

MR. KAROTKIN: Yes. We can leave that, or we can address that now if you would like. Mr. Neier representing the DIP lenders can take you through the changes, and if you have any questions.

THE COURT: I believe leave the changes; I don't have a problem with the changes, so let me just hear on those two unresolved issues.

MR. KAROTKIN: As we've set forth in our responsive pleading, Your Honor, we see no reason why the committee should not be put to its burden to demonstrate cause for derivative standing or for the taking of 2004 examination.

THE COURT: So they're a party in interest taking from 2004 exams, so just have to make an application.

MR. KAROTKIN: To make an application. They're seeking authority to do that without making an application. And in order to, you know, as I'm sure you're aware, there are certain requirements, as we've set forth in our pleadings, as to the cause. It has to be demonstrated in connection with both derivative standing and authority to take 2004 examinations. We don't think that that should be automatically dispensed with here. I think that following those procedures enables Your Honor to be a gatekeeper to determine whether assets of the estate should be utilized to

Page 50 1 pursue those types of claims or discovery. 2 THE COURT: Can I ask a question? 3 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes. THE COURT: If you didn't have the Stipulations in 4 5 the paper and the Debtor would do the -- who could bring the 6 claims that the committee is start to bring. I wouldn't be 7 acting as a gatekeeper. You wouldn't have to ask me for 8 permission to do it, would you? 9 MR. KAROTKIN: The Debtor wouldn't no. The Debtor 10 would have to ask permission for the 2004 examinations. 11 THE COURT: Okay. But let's talk about the 12 standing to assert claims. But isn't the Debtor really 13 giving up that ability in this Order by stipulating to these 14 issues? 15 MR. KAROTKIN: Two things, Your Honor. First, the 16 Debtor didn't --17 THE COURT: And if the answer is yes, so who's the 18 estate representative? 19 MR. KAROTKIN: Let me address that, two answers. 20 Number one, the Debtor didn't entirely give up the right to 21 challenge the liens; in certain areas, they have full rights 22 with respect to the hedge proceeds. Second --THE COURT: Yeah, but that's -- you know, I looked 23 24 at your -- in Paragraph 16, where you basically admit to the 25 extent and validity of the liens.

Pg 51 of 92 Page 51 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, Your Honor, after we did due 1 2 diligence and reviewed all of the papers, did a thorough 3 examination of perfection issues. We just didn't do it willy nilly because they asked us to do this. And I think 4 5 that in view of those circumstances, the Debtor has a 6 fiduciary. The Debtor didn't do this lightly. 7 THE COURT: We're not far away from the GM case, 8 mistakes were made. 9 MR. KAROTKIN: Mistake, yes. 10 THE COURT: And it happens. 11 MR. KAROTKIN: And they can come into Court and 12 they can simply demonstrate why they think it's appropriate 13 to move forward before they embark on a course of action 14 that will obviously incur substantial costs and expenses. 15 All we're asking is, like in any other case, they come 16 before you and say this is the reason they want to do this. 17 And if they have cause, it ought to be easy. But to 18 automatically grant them standing just doesn't seem 19 appropriate. 20 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 21 MR. LEBLANC: Good morning, Your Honor. Andrew 22 Leblanc, Milbank, Tweet, Hadley & McCloy, on behalf of the committee. Your Honor, we, I think, followed Your Honor's 23 24 lead in both AOG and SunEdison, SunEdison where Weil,

Gotshal represents the committee. Your Honor, I think in

both of those cases, sua sponte required that the committee be granted standing as part of the cash collateral Orders or the DIP Orders there. And we do think it's appropriate, and Your Honor is a gatekeeper as a trial judge in any event.

To the extent that we bring claims, there will --

THE COURT: I'm also passing on fees.

MR. LEBLANC: I'm sorry? And you're also passing on fees. You're a gatekeeper in both of those circumstances. So you will decide whether the claims are colorable, as required under default, and Your Honor will also decide on whether or not we're entitled to be paid administrative expenses for having brought those claims.

So we don't think anything more is necessary with respect to the standing, and Your Honor I think has done this twice in the very recent past, which was why we thought it was appropriate here. And it is, there's a timing element, although what they've drafted does hold the investigation period if we file a motion for standing. But we think it's an unnecessary administrative expense to burden the estate with the process, given the fact that Paragraph 16 waivers that the Debtors give, from A through D, are as extensive a waiver -- they carve out one particular set of collateral.

But with the exception of that, with any other claims, they've completely waived them. They've released

them, they've waived them, they've stipulated to them, so they've done everything you could possibly do. So we think it's an appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion to allow us standing to the extent that we believe there's a claim to bring.

With respect to the Rule 2004, Your Honor also did that in SunEdison. And, Your Honor, we think that's appropriate for an even more important reason, which is that doesn't toll the time for us to conduct our investigation. So to the extent that we have to take Rule 2004 and we have to first come to the Court and ask for permission, then that consumes a period of time. Now let me be clear, and I think Your Honor can take note of this, we have not filed the Rule 2004 motion yet. We expect and hope that we won't have to ever do that. We have been getting cooperation at the very — within days of us being retained.

THE COURT: So you're saying that you recognize you're going to have to file a motion to take a 2004 exam, which is apparently, the Debtor interprets the Order to say you can just simply start serving exams. What are your requests?

MR. LEBLANC: Well, this is what I -- the point
I'm trying to make, Your Honor, is we're not going to
unnecessarily seek formal 2004 discovery if we don't have
to. We have, from the beginning of the case, we served the

Debtors with an informal document request. After some time, we got better information flow from them. We've been able to do our investigation on a cooperative basis. We've had the same cooperation from the lenders.

And so we aren't going to seek formal 2004 discovery, service subpoenas, and things like that, unless we believe we have to. We could have because we, today, don't have an Order that allows us to come in -- or we don't have an Order that says we don't have to seek authority to bring a 2004 motion. But the point I'm making, Your Honor, is that we're not going to do that unless -- we're not going to seek formal discovery unless we conclude that we really need it.

THE COURT: But Mr. Karotkin said that even if the Debtor was the appropriate party, you would still have to seek authority pursuant to Rule 2004, I guess, every time you wanted to take a 2004 exam.

MR. LEBLANC: In the absence -- well --

THE COURT: Which is what a Trustee normally does.

MR. LEBLANC: No, I understand, in this
jurisdiction, Your Honor. In the Third Circuit, as example,
there's a standing Order that says you -- that dispenses
with the requirement to seek authority.

THE COURT: Ah, but we're not in the Third Circuit.

MR. LEBLANC: I understand, Your Honor, I understand. And, importantly, we're not asking for this relief from the requirement to seek authority to serve 2004 discoveries for everybody, but rather just for us. We're working within a limited period of time. We don't want that period of time to be consumed by the need to come to Court on what -- if and when we choose that we have to do it because there isn't cooperation forthcoming and there has been to date. But to the extent that that changes and we need to come, we just don't want to burden the Court and the estate with the administrative expense of coming and seeking authority from the Court do so solely with respect to an investigation that, as Your Honor has noted, we're the only ones who are conducting it at this point, the Debtor isn't.

So we'd ask, Your Honor, that you make those two modifications to the Order. And I will say that we thank the parties for working with us to resolve all the other objections and leaving just this issue to be resolved with the Court. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. NEIER: David Neier on behalf of Wells Fargo.

Good morning, Your Honor. A couple of things; first of all,
we're cooperating with both the Debtors and the committee in
their separate investigations. The Debtors have made
document requests of us and information requests of us in
lieu of 2004. With respect to the committee, I think we've

turned well over 5000 pages of document so far, even prior to the entry of this Order, and we've been doing that on a rolling basis and we're going to continue to roll it. They haven't given us a request; we just started producing all the lien and security and what-have-you documents. As we get them, they're getting them.

And with respect to standing, the Debtors have really reserved on two issues. As you may recall, Mr. Schrock in his first day said that there are certain unencumbered assets; he estimated approximately \$50 million worth of unencumbered assets. The DIP Order actually says that the liens are substantially valid, but it doesn't say they're all valid because the Debtor said they could not attest to that. So they are following up on two issues, that and the hedge proceeds.

So if Your Honor is going to do anything on standing, I don't think you should divest the Debtors of their standing, as is typical in a standing motion, because they are following up with things and they feel very strongly about it. And the hedge proceeds, which are, what, approximately \$450 million?

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. NEIER: The \$450 million, which Wells Fargo assets is its collateral and should be paid down on the first lien debt, is a critical, critical factor in this

Page 57 1 case; in fact, probably one of the most important factors in 2 terms of any reorganization efforts that are going to take 3 place in this Court and are the subject of intense negotiations. It would be highly inappropriate for the 4 5 Court to divest the Debtors of the standing with respect to 6 that. 7 THE COURT: What was the other issue that you said 8 is --? 9 MR. NEIER: They have asserted that certain assets are unencumbered. They have asserted that certain property 10 11 is unencumbered, and the DIP Order reflects that. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. NEIER: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. Does anyone else want to 15 be heard? 16 MR. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honor. Christopher 17 Marcus from Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the ad hoc second Two brief points, first is the gatekeeper 18 lien committee. 19 function. The standard here is that the Debtors are 20 unjustifiably failing to prosecute. I'm not aware of the 21 reason for the sua sponte grant of standing in the SunEdison 22 case, but all I've heard from the creditor's committee is that the Debtors have stipulated, which is a fact that is 23 24 consistent with virtually every Chapter 11 case.

That's right, that I take it that way.

THE COURT:

It's what they have to do to get the money.

MR. MARCUS: Well, the Debtors did an investigation. The standard is not that the Debtors are failing to prosecute; it's that they're unjustifiably failing to prosecute. The creditor's committee has to demonstrate colorability, and they have to demonstrate from a cost benefit perspective that it makes sense to grant them standing to allow them to pursue the claims and causes of action.

And it's not just, counsel mentioned that this was just sort of they don't want to go through the administrative burden of filing that motion. I just spent 15 or 17 days in front of Judge Chapman on a standing motion in the Sabine case that cost tens of millions of dollars, went up to the District Court. The District Court affirmed that was a real material factor in the case, that was a real issue in the case. And the inability of the creditor's committee to get standing because they couldn't satisfy that burden was very important for the Debtors. I don't see this as just an administrative step.

So unless there's some other reason for what Your Honor might conclude that the Debtors have unjustifiably failed to prosecute, I think the creditor's committee needs to be put to their burden under STN, have to demonstrate colorability, and they have to demonstrate cross-benefit.

Page 59 1 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 2 MR. MARCUS: Thank you, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Anyone else before I hear from the Debtor? 4 5 MR. KAROTKIN: Just briefly, Your Honor. First of 6 all, this is not the SunEdison case, as I'm sure you know 7 better than anyone. In SunEdison, there were allegations of 8 fraud, there was a rollup of the DIP, there were many 9 allegations. 10 THE COURT: Well, there's (indiscernible)in this 11 case, and I'm not sure that is really part of your 12 admission, that insider's traded on, or essentially traded 13 on inside information. 14 MR. KAROTKIN: Putting aside the fact there's no 15 basis for those allegations. 16 THE COURT: Well, that's not what the --17 MR. KAROTKIN: That's not --THE COURT: It's a very limited stipulation. It's 18 limited to really what the first lien lenders -- or what the 19 20 prepetition lenders did or didn't do. MR. KAROTKIN: I agree with that. But there's no 21 22 reason why --23 THE COURT: So why shouldn't the committee if it 24 discovers that somebody didn't file a UCC or terminated a 25 security interest, as we know, happens, be in a position to

bring that lawsuit; why do they have to come to me?

MR. KAROTKIN: Because maybe they're wrong, and maybe, like every other party, they should be subject to the same burdens that every other party in a Chapter 11 case is subject to. And if they're right, it's pretty easy to file a motion and get a hearing before the Court so that the Court and other parties' interests can weigh in on whether that's an appropriate expenditure of the estate's funds and resources.

The other factor to be considered, Your Honor, is that if they are granted automatic standing to do what they -- any type of lawsuit related to the challenge period, deprives the Debtor the right to settle that type of lawsuit. And I think that would be totally inappropriate, and those are the types of factors that have to be considered before a unilateral standing is granted.

THE COURT: I would say that an estate representative of the committee would have the authority on any claim that it asserted within that representation of the settlement.

MR. KAROTKIN: Again, but does that deprive the Debtor of the ability to settle it, and shouldn't those issues come before the Court at the appropriate time so the Court can decide on what basis will standing be granted or not be granted. It's very simple. You're available, you

Page 61 1 file a motion like everybody else. 2 THE COURT: But you've already settled, as far as the Debtor's concerned, you settled the claims against the 3 prepetition members, other than the couple of issues that 4 you have yet to, subject to a 90-day lookback period for 5 6 other parties and interests. You've made your settlement. 7 MR. KAROTKIN: Okay. So what is the burden on 8 them to come forward with something to demonstrate why the 9 assets of this estate should be devoted to a lawsuit? Let 10 them come in and show why. It's very simple. If there's a 11 legitimate basis to do so, you'll grand them standing. 12 THE COURT: Anything else? 13 MR. NEIER: One very minor point, Your Honor, David Neier. 14 THE COURT: What is this, (indiscernible)? 15 16 MR. NEIER: No, just one very minor point. You 17 say it's subject to a 90-day lookback period, but we're not 18 fussy about the time. And we've said that if they file a 19 standing motion, the time would automatically be tolled from 20 that day forward. So it's really, there is no time limit. 21 THE COURT: Is that what the Order provides, that 22 you have to file a standing motion with 90 days? 23 MR. NEIER: Correct. 24 THE COURT: Or you have to file a Complaint within

90 days?

MR. KAROTKIN: No, just the motion for standing.

MR. NEIER: Just a motion for standing, so that they can file a motion for standing tomorrow and the 90-day limit is gone. And that was a negotiated part of the Stip Order.

THE COURT: I don't need to hear anymore, okay.

One of the reasons I usually require, before I grant the committee the status of an estate representative and standing in these Orders, is that the action usually has to be commenced under these Orders within the period. And you can say you can file a standing motion and you can get before the Court, there's inevitable delay depending on the Court's calendar and availability. But as long as all you have to do is file the motion within the period and not close the period, you know, I think that is satisfactory.

You're certainly entitled -- I wouldn't, by the way, I wouldn't grant you standing necessarily or it's a different situation with respect to issues on which the Debtor did not. But, I mean, the Debtor has really only waived the claims against the prepetition lenders. And from what I've been reading in the various papers and other matters, there may be other claims that the Debtor hasn't counted on. But how do they investigate? There's this 90-day investigation period. If they can't serve 2004 Orders, how do they investigate?

Page 63 1 MR. NEIER: First of all --2 THE COURT: (indiscernible) the committee in a 3 separate position than somebody who comes in and wants to bring a lawsuit, this committee's got statutory and 4 5 fiduciary duties. 6 MR. NEIER: First of all, as they acknowledge, 7 they are investigating, they're getting cooperation. And, 8 again, if they need to take a 2004 examination, they can come to the Court. And we will represent to the Court that 9 10 from the Debtor's perspective, we're more than happy to 11 waive the 90-day period or whatever it is pending the resolution of the 2004 examination. 12 13 THE COURT: It's not your period to waive. You're 14 not the object to these claims. 15 MR. NEIER: In terms of timing? 16 THE COURT: It's not yours to waive. They're not 17 going to sue you; they're going to sue the banks or whoever. MR. NEIER: But it's our DIP Order as well. 18 19 THE COURT: And by the way, one point to consider 20 this for the future. I was told that you did all these investigations, there's no allegations in your application 21 22 relating to the examinations you've conducted or what you 23 did. And as we all know, mistakes are made. 24 MR. NEIER: They are, Your Honor, but as a matter 25 of professionalism, that's what we do at our law firm.

THE COURT: I know what I read and I don't know what I don't read. So I will -- I'll sign the Order as proposed, as long as anything you stayed should the committee file a claim or an application for STN, which I guess can go beyond the waivers that are in the Order.

MR. NEIER: Thank you, sir.

MR. KAROTKIN: Your Honor, with respect to the 2004, though.

THE COURT: You're going to have to submit an application if you tell me you're looking at a lien, and you can accompany that with a motion to extend the term if you're looking at certain information and somebody's not giving it to you, although it sounds like the prepetition lenders are giving you the information, and I don't know what other claims you're going to examine into.

MR. LEBLANC: I wouldn't expect that we would be filing a 2004. If Your Honor does agree, we're not likely to do it unless we have to; we're not going to do it unless we have to, and I hope we get cooperation. And, obviously, Your Honor, the investigation period only applies to the prepetition lenders. So to the extent that we're investigating other claims, that period of time is inapplicable to those claims.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Yes, sir.

MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor, once again, Richard

Page 65 1 Morrissey. I just wanted to correct the record and provide 2 the Court with an update regarding the Felicia Pierce matter. The Summons actually --3 THE COURT: Is she dismissing here? 4 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, she has agreed to sign the 5 6 Stipulation, which we will present to the Court to be so 7 ordered. But I just wanted to correct the record. The 8 Summons in that adversary proceeding has been issued. 9 THE COURT: It has been issued. What's the 10 pretrial conference date we have, do you know? We can just, 11 we'll just, we'll move the pretrial conference up today. 12 MR. MORRISSEY: Set for September 29th. 13 THE COURT: Okay, we can go back to 14 (indiscernible). 15 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Just remember, I have to write her a 17 letter. Let me deal with the sealing motion that I 18 received. I got the sealing motion, and I looked at the 19 list. And none of the reasons for the sealing motion was 20 that it would disclose the names of employees. There are no 21 names. 22 MR. KAROTKIN: I realize that, sir, but you can tell -- it's easy to extrapolate, for other employees to 23 24 extrapolate from the titles who they would be. 25 THE COURT: Even if you remove the locations, they

Page 66 1 can still tell? 2 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, that's what we're told, yes. And that would not be good information to have available to 3 the employees. 4 5 THE COURT: Tell me why it's bad to have that 6 information public. 7 MR. KAROTKIN: Because generally, the employees 8 don't like their salary information public. And for other 9 employees to see what others in the firm are making causes a 10 lot of consternation. 11 THE COURT: All right, counselor, I'll grant the 12 motion. 13 MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, sir. THE COURT: Even though you hadn't (indiscernible) 14 15 it. Go ahead. 16 MR. KAROTKIN: By way of background, the motion 17 was filed on July 27th, and the motion seeks approval of 18 three employee programs, the first being a KERP program 19 covering --20 THE COURT: Excuse me. Go ahead. 21 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, the first program, Your Honor, 22 is what we call the KERP program covering approximately 580 23 essentially rank-and-file-type employees. The second 24 element is what we call the KEP, K-E-P, program covering 111 25 employees. Those employees are the more administrative, had

functions such as accounting, marketing, human resources, environmental compliance, engineering. And the last program the KEIP, K-E-I-P program, which covers the Debtors for senior executives. Each of those programs is described in quite detail in the motion.

As we noted in the responsive pleading, Your Honor, that we filed yesterday, the Debtor's first and second lienholders have no objection to the relief requested in the motion. Also, as noted in that reply, Your Honor, after consultation with the creditor's committee and in order to provide the creditor's committee with additional time to discuss certain aspects of both the KEP program and the KEIP program, the Debtors and the committee have agreed to the terms of a proposed revised Order, which would approve the KERP program, would approve the second quarterly payment only under the KEP program, which would be for the period ending June 30th, would adjourn consideration of the relief requested with respect to the balance of the KEP program and would adjourn consideration of the entire KEIP program.

We did submit a proposed revised Order to the Court and filed it on the docket, and I could hand it up to Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's the letter tab after this? I have it back here --

Page 68 1 MR. KAROTKIN: 12, I think, or 11(b). 2 THE COURT: I'll check if I have it. Has the U.S. Trustee seen the revised Order? 3 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: And basically the proposal is to 6 adjourn the KEIP for the day, to approve the KERP, and to 7 approve the KEP, but only up to the second quarterly 8 payment. So why don't we focus on those. Let me start with 9 the KERP. Is there any objection from the U.S. Trustee to 10 the KERP? I don't know if you've seen the --11 MS. GOLDEN: Yes, Your Honor. For the record, Susan Golden from the U.S. Trustee's Office. Yes, Your 12 13 Honor, we've seen all the information that the Court has 14 received in its unredacted form. We have no objection to 15 the, I think it's for the general rank-and-file KERP program 16 and we have received the information on the rank-and-file 17 incentive program. And I think that our objection was 18 really an information to objection overall. So if the Court 19 is satisfied that Your Honor has received the information 20 necessary in order to make a determination as to whether the 21 participants are not insiders and whether the plan is truly 22 incentive, then the U.S. Trustee defers to the Court. 23 THE COURT: Which is the plan that implicates the 24 relative? 25 MR. KAROTKIN: The KEP.

Page 69 1 The KEP, all right. Let me start with THE COURT: 2 the KERP then. I've reviewed the KERP. It does not appear 3 to have any insiders involved in it. It's consistent with 4 the Debtor's prepetition practices. It was then and is now 5 and is now an appropriate exercise of business judgment and 6 justified by the facts and circumstances of the case, so 7 I'll approve the KERP. 8 MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, sir. 9 THE COURT: The two plans. Now let's get onto the 10 KEP. 11 MR. KAROTKIN: We can actually --12 THE COURT: Let me just hear from the U.S. Trustee before we --13 14 MS. GOLDEN: Thank you, Your Honor. You know, as 15 I said a moment ago, our objection was really informational. 16 And we felt that it was important for the Court to see the 17 information that the U.S. Trustee had received. The Debtor 18 has actually added additional information and an additional 19 declaration from the Debtor's CFO. But, you know, it was 20 important that Your Honor, who was an independent duty under 21 Section 503, received the information to make a 22 determination as to whether there are insiders and whether 23 the KEP is truly an incentive plan. 24 THE COURT: What if there are no insiders; what 25 difference does it make?

Page 70 1 MS. GOLDEN: Well, the issue really is whether or 2 not it's an incentive plan. THE COURT: So could it be a mixed retention, and 3 I don't even have to be facetious because part of it is a 4 5 retention plan. 6 MS. GOLDEN: No question. 7 THE COURT: And part of it is an incentive plan. MS. GOLDEN: No question. 8 9 THE COURT: Even the Debtor says it's largely --10 three times -- largely an incentive plan, which means more -11 12 MS. GOLDEN: I mean, Debtors often say that. You 13 know, Debtors often say that. So, you know, that's neither 14 here nor there. That's what Debtors, you know, that's what 15 Debtors often say. One of the issues that came up in the 16 reply that was not in the motion was the standard of review 17 of who the possible insiders could be. The U.S. Trustee 18 still takes the position that the corporate definition is the appropriate one because the Debtor's general partner is 19 20 a corporation. 21 THE COURT: Well, the lender is a separation of 22 the Board of Directors. MS. GOLDEN: Board of Directors, which are 23 24 corporate concepts, not partnership concepts. 25 THE COURT: I agree you can --

MS. GOLDEN: You know, the compensation committee
was appointed to the board.

THE COURT: So do you object to the KEP (indiscernible)?

MS. GOLDEN: It's not an objection to the KEP in concept. It really was informational so that the Court could make the determination as to what standard applies and whether or not there are insiders. I do also note for the record that aside from the gentleman who is the CEO's brother, there are, I think, four or five other KEP participants who were appointed directly by the Board of Directors. Your Honor did say in SunEdison that that is a factor that Your Honor would consider.

Also, we just want to note that while the amounts

-- the average amounts per employee in connection with the

KEP are set out in the motion. Obviously because something
is an average, mathematically some people are earning less,
some people are earning significantly more. But, in

essence, you know, that's really where we are, that Your

Honor had all the information that was necessary to make a
determination as to the standard and the attribute of the
participants.

THE COURT: By the way, you didn't mention Mr.

Karotkin, but I think the discretionary fund issue is also being moved over to a later date?

MR. KAROTKIN: No, that is not.

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- MS. GOLDEN: We also have an issue on the

  discretionary fund because they standards and criteria have

  not been set forth, and it's a million dollars and that's a

  lot of money.
- 6 THE COURT: This is for the KEP?
- 7 MS. GOLDEN: It's for the KEP and the KERP. It's giust for those employees.
  - THE COURT: So what are the standards for the discretionary fund, other than discretion, which I know is a very loose standard.
  - MR. KAROTKIN: Your Honor, the discretionary fund, as we've indicated, is merely a way to address promotions within the KERP and the KEP. It's not for the KEIP, it's very clear, promotions for new hires so that they can be treated in the same fashion. It's not to provide --
  - THE COURT: To new hires, you mean not the people on the list?
  - MR. KAROTKIN: If we hire someone tomorrow, a new hire, so that they can be appropriately compensated as well in the same basis that the other employees are compensated. That's all, I mean, it's a fairly common practice. As we've noted in our reply, it's generally assumed in many, many other cases so that management has the discretion and ability to compensate people appropriately, you know, within

Page 73 1 the confines of the general compensation practices of the 2 company. 3 THE COURT: Let me raise an issue, two issues I have with the KEP. It looks to me like it's partially 4 5 retentive and partially incentive, because -- I'm looking at 6 Page 12, I guess, in the motion. And it'd be beneficiary to 7 the program, earn 60 percent of the award for missing all 8 the partners. 9 MR. KAROTKIN: That's correct. THE COURT: And that sounds like a retentive only. 10 11 MR. KAROTKIN: Although there were other -- there 12 were incentive elements in terms of personal performance 13 metrics and things like that. But, yes, if we're on target, 14 they still would get something. 15 THE COURT: And assuming at least that portion is 16 retentive, you have the brother of an insider. And I've 17 heard Ms. Golden that the way you sent to partnership. 18 MR. KAROTKIN: It still applies in a partnership 19 anyway. 20 THE COURT: I know, but for governance purposes, it looks like a corporation. It's got a Board of Directors. 21 22 MR. KAROTKIN: Again, that would apply in either 23 case, so we're not trying to abruptly --24 THE COURT: And I have an issue because I don't

know enough about these four or five employees that are

Page 74 1 appointed by the board, which start to sound like an 2 officers, regardless of what their title is and I don't know 3 anything about their duties. 4 MR. KAROTKIN: Well, I think, Your Honor, that we did file --5 6 THE COURT: Well, did you file --7 MR. KAROTKIN: We did file the file of Mr. 8 Jackson, which addresses all of the participants in the KEP. THE COURT: I think I'd like a little more -- I 9 10 mean, the insider issue is not going to go away in terms of 11 the brother. The brother is clearly an insider, so he's an insider under the code. It doesn't matter what his duties 12 13 are because his status is not based on what he does; it's 14 based on what the brother does. 15 MR. KAROTKIN: Well, again, yeah, Mr. Jackson's 16 declaration did address the insider status of every person 17 included in the KEP. THE COURT: Is this #4 -- Document 414? 18 19 MR. KAROTKIN: Yup, 412. 20 THE COURT: Is that in your book? 21 MR. KAROTKIN: Should be. I can hand you up 22 another copy. 23 THE COURT: What's the number on top? I just have 24 one document, an 84-page document, and I have --25 MR. KAROTKIN: The document is 412. I could hand

Page 75 1 you up a copy. 2 THE COURT: Okay, all right. 3 MR. KAROTKIN: In Paragraph 7 and 8, I think address the issue that your concerned with as to all the 4 5 participants, which would include the ones you mentioned. 6 THE COURT: Yeah, but, you know, these are just 7 conclusory statements. If you go back and look at what I 8 was given in SunEdison, it was a confidential affidavit and 9 declaration, but it really told me who the people were, what 10 they did, and who they reported to. 11 MR. KAROTKIN: Well, we can certainly supplement the record with that as to those five individuals. 12 13 THE COURT: Well, what I was going to suggest is 14 the following. I don't have a problem with the incentive 15 portion of the KEP, and maybe it makes sense to divide it 16 into two, which is the 100 percent. And what's the third 17 category, the stretch? MR. KAROTKIN: Can I have one minute? 18 19 THE COURT: Sure. 20 MR. KAROTKIN: May I make a suggestion? 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. KAROTKIN: With respect to the relief we are 23 seeking today, which is only the second quarter payment, I'm advised that those targets which would enable the full 24

payment of that amount were achieved. So the incentive

Page 76 1 amount was achieved. There's not an issue of people 2 receiving --3 THE COURT: Well, what I was going to say is that I would approve the incentive portion, which is the 100 4 5 percent in stretch. Because based upon the facts which are 6 set forth in the declarations, they've been developed 7 consistently with the past -- and maybe mis-consistently in 8 the past, apparently they have been reached, which is good. 9 With respect to the retention portion, I would approve it, 10 except for the four or five individuals and the relative. 11 I'm don't know how you're going to solve the relative 12 problem, maybe the -- but the other people who were 13 appointed by the board can be resolved with a little more 14 disclosure and just kick that over to the next hearing. 15 MR. KAROTKIN: That's fine. But I think what I'm 16 saying is kick it over to the next hearing because every 17 individual has met the incentive portion. 18 THE COURT: Maybe the incentive is too low? MR. KAROTKIN: No, it's actually not too low. 19 20 THE COURT: Everybody (indiscernible). 21 MR. KAROTKIN: Well, they're terrific operators, 22 Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: But this is a continuing process. 24 MR. KAROTKIN: Again, and the next two payments 25 have been reserved for future hiring.

Page 77 1 I hear what you're saying, but I still THE COURT: 2 3 MR. KAROTKIN: But we'll give you additional information on the other folks. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Is that an acceptable 6 resolution of this issue; does anybody want to be heard? 7 MR. LEES: Your Honor, Alex Lees of Milbank for 8 the committee. As counsel has represented, we are 9 adjourning a number of issues. I just want to make very 10 clear that we have raised some issues with the Debtors. 11 have real substantive issues. Unlike the U.S. Trustee, 12 these are not procedural issues. It's got what targets are 13 appropriate, whether incentives are properly aligned, and 14 we're trying to work that out. We've tried to take a very 15 targeted approach, which is why we're not objecting to the 16 rank-and-file and to the second quarter payment for the 17 midlevel. But we hope to work that out with them. And if 18 they don't, we will be back before Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: What's the adjourn date of this? 20 MR. KAROTKIN: September 15th. 21 THE COURT: All right. As I said, I'll approve 22 the KERP. I don't hear an objection to the KERP. MR. LEES: No, Your Honor. I just wanted to make 23 24 clear that we're reserving our rights on the remainder. 25 THE COURT: All right.

Page 78 1 MR. KAROTKIN: The only other item, I think, is 2 the discretionary fund. THE COURT: Well, the discretionary is apparently 3 kind of a true offer where if you hire somebody else, you 4 5 can put them in the same position, as I assume, a person of 6 comparable -- a person in a comparable position would earn 7 that person (indiscernible). 8 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, they would. 9 MS. GOLDEN: I apologize, Your Honor. We would 10 also like a copy of whatever is submitted to the Court. 11 THE COURT: Of course, of course. 12 MS. GOLDEN: We have the right to review as well. 13 THE COURT: Of course. So I'm approving the KERP. 14 The KEIP, K-E-I-P, is being adjourned the September 15th, 15 and I'll approve to the KEP to the extent they're paying the 16 second quarterly payment based upon the representation that 17 the targets, the 100 percent target at least, has been 18 reached. 19 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, sir. 20 THE COURT: So, I don't have a problem with that 21 portion of it as an incentive program. Subject to hearing 22 from the committee, all this is without prejudice to a 23 challenge to the KEP. MR. KAROTKIN: And I think that the Order we 24 25 provided you accurately reflects what you just said.

Page 79 1 THE COURT: Does it? 2 MR. KAROTKIN: I think the revised Order 3 accurately reflects what you just said. THE COURT: If you will just submit an Order. 4 Ιf 5 there are any further changes off of the revised Order, and 6 then just submit a blackline copy of the Order. 7 MR. KAROTKIN: We will do so. Thank you, sir. 8 THE COURT: Last, I think we have the equity 9 committee motion. It's my motion, but I'll give up the 10 floor. Didn't stop him from sitting there for two hours, 11 he's jumped up. 12 MR. KAROTKIN: Yeah, I seen him already. 13 THE COURT: I'll hear everybody, but we're not 14 trying this issue today. I just want to hear about the 15 scope of hearing and set the schedule. 16 MR. KAROTKIN: Yeah, as we indicated in our 17 omnibus response, in addition to addressing why an equity 18 committee is not appropriate here, we intend to take 19 discovery. We've asked for a status conference for Your 20 Honor to set an appropriate schedule, recognizing that, I 21 think you said yourself in the SunEdison decision that it's 22 not a valuation hearing. 23 THE COURT: No, it's not. But on the other hand, 24 if people are going to give me valuation evidence, which

apparently most singulars are going to do, I'll consider it.

Page 80 1 MR. KAROTKIN: Okay. And as a consequence of 2 that, we're going to want to take the deposition of the 3 (indiscernible). THE COURT: It sounds like a valuation hearing. 4 5 MR. KAROTKIN: And have the opportunity to present 6 appropriate evidence. 7 THE COURT: How long do you need to discovery, 8 besides taking the deposition of their -- who is it, Mr. 9 Lewis? 10 MR. KAROTKIN: Mr. Lewis. I think that if we were 11 to schedule the hearing sometime mid --12 THE COURT: Just don't have a discovery --13 MR. KAROTKIN: By now, we're just talking about 14 the deposition of Mr. Lewis. 15 THE COURT: Okay. And notwithstanding that it's 16 Labor Day coming up, I assume you could accomplish that in 17 30 days? 18 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Anybody else feel they 19 20 need discovery in this, on this matter? 21 MR. NEIER: Your Honor, David Neier on behalf of 22 Wells Fargo. Both of the prepetition secured parties, as 23 the first lien and the second liens, filed joinders, and we 24 25 THE COURT: Joinders in the motion or the

Page 81 1 opposition? 2 MR. NEIER: Joinders in the opposition. 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. NEIER: So we want to be active participants 4 5 both in the discovery and in the deposition. And while it's 6 really great that the seconds believe they're the fulcrum 7 and the unsecured creditors have put in pleadings that 8 they're the fulcrum, and now the equity has come in and said 9 they're the fulcrum. 10 THE COURT: Maybe everybody will get their 11 (crosstalk). 12 MR. NEIER: Nobody's demonstrated that we're not 13 the fulcrum, and we don't want to be the fulcrum. But our 14 debt is already trading at a discount and the unit holder is 15 trading about half of what SunEdison is trading. 16 THE COURT: Well, SunEdison's a different case. I 17 do have a question for the people who have put in papers on 18 behalf of Equity. I notice that there are preferred unit 19 holders and common unit holders. Are they in the same 20 position, or do you really need to committees? 21 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, they're not in the same --22 Martin Bienenstock with Proskaur Rose. 23 THE COURT: And do they have the same cancellation of debt issues? 24 25 MR. BIENENSTOCK: I'm always worried as a

Page 82 1 bankruptcy lawyer to ask questions. 2 MR. KAROTKIN: I could answer to that. 3 THE COURT: No, I think that's an important issue in the case --4 5 MR. KAROTKIN: They do not. 6 THE COURT: -- to differentiate it., 7 MR. KAROTKIN: The preferred B, the unit Bs do not 8 have --9 THE COURT: These are the preferred stockholders? 10 MR. KAROTKIN: Neither of the preferred 11 stockholders have the (indiscernible)issue. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Your Honor, speaking for the clients on whose behalf we filed the motion that's been 14 15 about the prefer, the preferred and common unit holders are 16 asking for one committee; some of them have both preferred. 17 I had actually stood up for a different purpose, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BIENENSTOCK: Going back to the Court's 19 20 initial inquiry on discovery. If the Debtor or the 21 statutory credit's committee is going to put on any type of 22 valuation witness or proffer some type of report, within 23 that same 30 days, we would like the opportunity to take 24 their deposition. So we'd like them to designate that 25 person or entity in the next seven days, and then we'll

Page 83 1 schedule a deposition so we can get this done within the 30 2 days. THE COURT: Well, I don't know if they have to --3 if they do intend to do it and they have such a report 4 5 ready, Mr. Lewis has already committed. 6 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Right, but I'm saying -- I'm not 7 asking for the report in seven days. I'm saying tell us 8 within the next seven days if you're going to do it, so that 9 we can take that person or entity's deposition within the same 30 days. Otherwise, this is going to stretch out far 10 11 too long. THE COURT: Well, it may, and that may be a result 12 13 of a -- it sounds like it's turning into a valuation 14 hearing. 15 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Which we don't want. 16 THE COURT: I understand that, but somebody's put 17 in, you know, an expert valuation report. And I have to 18 consider it, I can't not consider it. 19 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Especially when one of the 20 Court's considerations in SunEdison and every other equity 21 committee motion goes to the issue of is there some 22 plausibility of equity value. We understand that. We, 23 frankly, think it's enough for people just to submit their 24 reports. But now that they're taking discovery, we want to

try to keep a level playing field.

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THE COURT: Well, I had an evidentiary hearing in SunEdison, and I can have an evidentiary hearing on a competing arguments regarding whether or not Debtor is hopefully insolvent. It could be interpreted the Debtor is hopelessly insolvent, but because they concealed the D issue, concealed the I issue, I would think that a committee is appropriate only just on that issue.

MR. BIENENSTOCK: We agree.

THE COURT: But, you know, that doesn't -- okay.

Why don't we do this? Any other reports have to be filed within 30 days. In the meantime, you can take Mr. Lewis's deposition within the 30 days. We'll have another conference third week in September, and then we'll decide whether you need any further discovery or we can just go straight to a hearing on this. How does that sound?

MR. BIENENSTOCK: That'd be great.

MR. KAROTKIN: That's fine.

MR. LEES: Your Honor, Alex Lees for the committee. As has been recognized, valuation is an issue that's coming to the fore. We filed a brief statement yesterday. The committee obviously has strong views on valuation and the increasing value of the Midland basin assets, as well as the reduction in costs that has led to the improvement in value across the Debtor's portfolio. So we also intend to be active participants in discussions

Page 85 1 about value and also discussions about the appropriate 2 disposition of the Debtor's assets. 3 THE COURT: Do you intend to file an expert report on valuation? 4 5 MR. BIENENSTOCK: At this time, I can't say one 6 way or another. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Actually, I have a question, it's a practical question. If I appoint a committee, how do 8 9 you get paid in this case? 10 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Your Honor --11 THE COURT: There's no carve out for an equity 12 committee. MR. BIENENSTOCK: I understand. That is not a 13 problem for the following simple reason. If they're going 14 15 to confirm a plan, one requirement is that all allowed admin 16 expenses have to be paid. 17 THE COURT: Okay, all right. MR. NEIER: Your Honor, David Neier, on behalf of 18 19 Wells Fargo. 20 THE COURT: I remember you from the other 21 (indiscernible). 22 MR. NEIER: I just want to say one thing, okay. 23 On payment, there had been equity committees appointed where 24 they're only paid as any recovery to --25 THE COURT: I know.

Page 86 1 MR. NEIER: -- as opposed to being paid from the 2 lender --3 THE COURT: I suggested that in SunEdison, but they didn't like that. 4 5 MR. NEIER: Well, we make the same suggestion 6 here, Your Honor, especially if it's just about the 7 purviews. 8 MR. BIENENSTOCK: To Mr. Neier's point, I think 9 Mr. Neier's clients overlooks, as certain other parties 10 overlook, the fact that Congress put an examiner into the 11 Code on a mandatory basis in this case, if anyone moves for 12 it, and there's no cost benefit test. The difference 13 between an examiner --14 THE COURT: That can fix the budget. If you're 15 taking about the second subsection, I'll fix the budget. 16 MR. BIENENSTOCK: You couldn't but it's going to 17 be based on an appropriate investigation, so it still could be a significant number. The only difference --18 19 THE COURT: You see, what you said concerns me. 20 When you start to talk about an appropriate investigation 21 and you go beyond the value and you're talking about your 22 CODI claims, which you alluded to, that means I got the Debtor doing it, maybe a credit's committee doing it, and 23 24 now you're implying that you want to do it. And that sounds

like it starts to get expensive.

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MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Could I appoint an equity committee solely on the CODI issue so that you can ensure that, to the extent the Debtor is proposing a plan or is contemplating something preplan that will protect, I guess, it's the common unit holders. Yeah, you're authorized to act as a committee for that. But whatever else you do, you're doing it on your own dime.

MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, two things, Your Honor.

First, please do not assume that the committee we're asking for would do a duplicate or a triplicate investigation. I can imagine reasons why we would look a stance at a Debtor's investigation of its own people, but the statutory creditor's committee is another story.

On Your Honor's question as to a committee solely for the cancellation of indebtedness issue, my preliminary reaction to that is that would be insufficient. It's got to include both that and valuation because the bottom line is, each constituency of creditors are going to look for enough value for themselves. And we've seen in enough cases in this circuit and other circuits that constituencies of creditors love it when they find more than enough value, but can tell the Court, well, it's just enough for us, and then they get a windfall. So there's no way we believe an equity committee should be prevented from valuation.

Page 88 1 I guess I didn't phrase the guestion THE COURT: 2 If I determine that the Debtor is hopefully properly. insolvent -- I should have said that -- could I then appoint 3 4 an equity committee for the purpose of, for lack of a better 5 phrase, the CODI issue. 6 MR. BIENENSTOCK: I think the answer is yes, of 7 course. But perhaps I'm guilty of being biased here, but I 8 don't think the Court can remotely on these facts find 9 hopeless insolvency. THE COURT: That brings me to my -- actually, I 10 11 had a question for Mr. Karotkin, if I could ask it. One of 12 the arguments you make in the KEIP is that these people are 13 very important and they're administering \$4 billion worth of 14 assets. If I grant the motion on that basis, are you 15 judicially estopped from arguing that the Debtor's assets 16 are not worth at least \$4 billion. 17 MR. KAROTKIN: I think that was an erroneous reflection of the party, Your Honor. 18 19 THE COURT: Well, but that's what you say. 20 MR. KAROTKIN: It was really take the book value. 21 THE COURT: Well, are you telling me that they're 22 not administering \$4 billion worth of assets? 23 MR. KAROTKIN: Pardon me? 24 THE COURT: Are you telling --25 MR. KAROTKIN: I'm telling you there is no \$4

Page 89 1 billion worth of Enterprise value. 2 THE COURT: Notwithstanding what the motion says. 3 MR. KAROTKIN: Notwithstanding what the motion 4 says. 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right, so let's do this to 6 save time. Oh, Mr. Gamza, come up. Come on, we'll share. 7 MR. GAMZA: Very briefly, Your Honor. First of 8 all, I'd like to introduce Mr. Lewis who's here. 9 MR. LEWIS: How do you do? 10 THE COURT: You've become a popular guy in these 11 proceedings. 12 MR. GAMZA: Also, in response to Your Honor's 13 question, we also represent both preferred and common. We 14 think that one committee would certainly be sufficient. 15 THE COURT: Certainly, on a valuation basis, it's 16 one committee, although does one have a preference over the 17 other in distribution? I'm sure they do. 18 MR. GAMZA: But it's not uncommon, Your Honor, for 19 different interests to be represented on a single committee. 20 It happens quite commonly. 21 THE COURT: I understand. But if the argument is, 22 you know, when you get to the level, if they're satisfied, 23 they're not going to worry about the next level and you have 24 two levels, it's always an issue. 25 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Committees with senior and

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junior debt exist all the time.

MR. GAMZA: The last point, Your Honor, that I make is the CODI and the valuation are almost flip sides of the same coin because of the risk value for equity, which, you know, we believe there is, then you don't have a CODI issue. And if you have a CODI issue, it's because there's no sufficient value for equity. So it seems like one way or another, there are interests here of equity that will need to be represented in the case.

THE COURT: We have someone else here. Yes, sir.

MR. LOHAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian
Lohan on behalf of Equity First Holdings. We have 10
million common units; we're only in the common. And I agree
with what Mr. Hammer has said, if (indiscernible)goes beyond
the debt, then the CODI issue is resolved. The only other
point I'd like to make is we did not file expert valuation
because we didn't think this was going to turn into a
valuation.

THE COURT: Well, that's what it looks like.

MR. LOHAN: And I don't know that we will, but we will make a decision quickly.

THE COURT: Well, let's just say that any expert report, any reports on value, have to be filed within 30 days. I'll schedule another conference for Thursday,

September 22nd, which is just beyond the 30 days, and then

Page 91 you'll decide how to proceed at that point. And in the meantime, Mr. Karotkin, you can take Mr. Lewis's deposition within the 30 days. MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, sir. THE COURT: All right. MR. KAROTKIN: I think that concludes the agenda. THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. ALL: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 12:39 PM) 

Page 92 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Digitally signed by Sonya Ledanski Sonya Hyde 6 DN: cn=Sonya Ledanski Hyde, o, ou, Ledanski Hyde email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US Date: 2016.08.22 16:59:30 -04'00' 7 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 23 Mineola, NY 11501 24 25 August 22, 2016 Date: